Waco Siege

The Waco siege was the confrontation between federal law enforcement and the Branch Davidians, a religious group led by David Koresh (born Vernon Wayne Howell on August 17, 1959) at the Mount Carmel Center near Waco, Texas. It began with a failed raid by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) on February 28, 1993, in which four ATF agents were killed and more than 20 were wounded; it continued as a 51-day standoff under the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and ended on April 19, 1993 when the complex burned after the FBI inserted tear gas.¹

ATF Investigation

According to the Special Counsel's statement of facts, the McLennan County Sheriff's Department told ATF in May 1992 that Koresh had received large shipments of firearms, inert grenades and black powder at a small structure known as the Mag Bag, about six miles from the main living quarters, and ATF investigation found United Parcel Service deliveries of suspicious firearms components and possible explosive precursor materials. After internal meetings in December 1992, ATF began an undercover operation, rented a house about 325 yards from the complex, and began surveillance on January 11, 1993; ATF special agent Robert Rodriguez, posing as a student, made contact with Koresh in late January and visited the complex up to and including February 28.²

ATF sought aerial reconnaissance and other support from the Department of Defense and the Texas National Guard beginning in December 1992. A representative of the department told ATF on December 4 that support would be reimbursable unless the investigation had a "drug nexus"; ATF said there was none, and its later requests to the Guard referred to possible methamphetamine production at the complex. The Texas National Guard flew a UC-26 thermal-imaging mission on January 6, 1993, followed by flights on January 14 (Alabama National Guard) and February 3, 6, 18 and 25.²

On February 25, 1993, Dennis Green, United States Magistrate Judge for the Western District of Texas, issued an arrest warrant for Koresh and a warrant to search the Mag Bag and the complex, on an affidavit sworn by ATF case agent David Aguilera that had been prepared with Assistant United States Attorneys Bill Johnston and John Phinizy.¹

February 28, 1993

A force of 76 ATF agents attempted to execute the warrants. The Treasury Department's September 1993 report states that a cameraman from the Waco station KWTX-TV, sent to cover the expected raid, became lost on roads near the complex and told a letter carrier, a follower of Koresh, about the impending raid; the letter carrier warned Koresh while the undercover agent was inside, and the agent left, reported that Koresh had said "the ATF and the National Guard were coming," and was told to proceed. The entry teams, concealed in cattle trailers, arrived more than 40 minutes after Koresh received the tip. Gunfire erupted as the agents left the trailers, and the exchange continued for almost 90 minutes before a cease-fire was arranged.¹

The agents killed were Conway C. LeBleu, Todd W. McKeehan, Robert J. Williams and Steven D. Willis.¹ The Special Counsel's figure of "at least 82" Davidian dead for the whole confrontation includes six Davidians killed on February 28 and excludes two unborn children.²

The FBI Siege

The FBI took control of the scene. Jeffrey Jamar, Special Agent in Charge of the San Antonio office, became on-scene commander; Supervisory Special Agent Byron Sage was sent to Waco on February 28 as a negotiator, the FBI later assigned Gary Noesner to lead the negotiation team, and several weeks later Clinton Van Zandt replaced him; Richard Rogers commanded the FBI Hostage Rescue Team. Over the 51 days more than 40 law enforcement officers took part in negotiations, which the Special Counsel's report says relied "upon behavioral psychologists and religious experts for advice"; on March 3 the behavioral psychologist Park Dietz advised that Koresh would not leave the complex. Between February 28 and March 23 Koresh allowed 35 people to leave, and only two after March 23.²

Tactical measures during the standoff included cutting off the electricity, moving vehicles unpredictably, using seven to 10 flashbangs, and "the use of disturbing sounds around the complex"; some negotiators believed these actions interfered with their efforts. The active duty armed forces supplied equipment and advice, including Special Forces personnel who provided thermal imaging equipment and training, and the Air Force supplied television jamming equipment that contractors operated briefly. A member of the British Special Air Service was present as an observer early in the standoff.²

The FBI's tear gas planning is dated in the Special Counsel's report from early March: a "Proposed Operations Plan" of March 10, a Revision 2 of March 14, an e-mail of March 16 from Deputy Assistant Director Danny Coulson to Assistant Director Larry Potts, a negotiation-team memorandum of March 22 indicating willingness to consider tactical use of tear gas, a March 23 request by Rogers to implement the plan, and a Revision 3 initialed by Jamar on March 27.²

Consultation with Igor Smirnov

In a series of closed meetings that began on March 17, 1993 in suburban northern Virginia, the Russian physician Igor Smirnov of the Moscow Medical Academy briefed FBI officials on a computerized acoustic "psycho-correction" device. Defense Electronics, citing an unnamed participant and a memorandum of the Richmond firm Psychotechnologies Corp., reported in July 1993 that the FBI, "which was looking for a viable option to deal with Koresh," asked after several meetings for a proposal on requirements and procedures for using the device at Waco; that officials "wanted the Russians to promise zero risk," which the Russians would not do; and that Smirnov had brought only "entry-level equipment." Representatives of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Advanced Research Projects Agency were also said to be present.³

Newsweek reported in August 1994 that "Experts from the FBI Counter-Terrorism Center secretly met in Arlington, Va." with Smirnov, whose plan was "piping subliminal messages from sect members' families through the phone lines during negotiations," and that "the FBI backed out of Smirnov's Waco strategy."⁴ Smirnov told the Moscow Times in July 1994 that the FBI had explored using his methods, and the paper reported that a Village Voice article had quoted an FBI official to the same effect.⁵ The writer Sharon Weinberger recorded Chris Morris's account that the FBI was put off when Smirnov answered a question about failure by saying that Koresh's followers might slit each other's throats.⁶

The Decision to Gas

The negotiators began to lose hope in late March, and on March 27 Davidian Steve Schneider told them that the FBI should set the building on fire. On April 7 and 8 FBI deputy director Floyd Clarke and Potts traveled to Waco and, after meetings with Jamar and Rogers, agreed that a tactical resolution was appropriate. On April 12 the FBI presented Attorney General Janet Reno with a briefing book; on April 14 Director William Sessions convened a meeting at which military experts, among them General Schoomaker and a Department of Defense toxicologist, answered her questions. The materials prepared for Reno included Dietz's written opinion that negotiations were unlikely to resolve the crisis and that Koresh would probably continue to abuse the children. On April 14 Koresh also told negotiators that he would surrender once he had finished writing an interpretation of the Seven Seals of Revelation. Reno approved the plan at about 7:00 p.m. Waco time on April 17 and told President Bill Clinton on April 18.²

April 19, 1993

The FBI's combat engineering vehicles (CEVs) approached the complex at 6:00 a.m.; Sage telephoned in, told Schneider that a tactical operation was beginning that was "not an assault," and announced through a public address system that tear gas was being inserted. At 6:05 a.m. HRT sniper Lon Horiuchi radioed "compromise," meaning that the FBI was taking fire from the complex; the Special Counsel found that the FBI did not return fire. The Special Counsel also found that an FBI agent fired three pyrotechnic tear gas rounds at 8:08 a.m. at a concrete construction pit about 75 feet from the living quarters.²

The last statement captured by a listening device in the complex, at 11:54 a.m., was "Keep that fire going . . . keep it." At 12:06 p.m. an FBI agent saw a man in a gas mask near the front door; at 12:07 p.m. forward-looking infrared tape shows a fire signature in a second-floor room at the southeast corner, at 12:08 p.m. another in the dining room area, and then one at the rear of the chapel stage. Davidians David Thibodeau, Derek Lovelock, Jamie Castillo and Clive Doyle left the chapel, and nine Davidians in all left the building; Graeme Craddock later said he had seen a man pouring Coleman fuel in the chapel area. The Treasury report states that "more than 70 residents died."¹²

Inquiries

President Clinton directed the Departments of the Treasury and Justice to review the actions of ATF and the FBI. The Treasury Waco Administrative Review Team, established on April 29, 1993 under Assistant Secretary Ronald K. Noble with Edwin O. Guthman and Lewis C. Merletti, issued its report on the ATF investigation of Koresh in September 1993.¹ Joint hearings of the House Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Crime and the Government Reform and Oversight Committee's Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs, and Criminal Justice were held beginning July 19, 1995.⁷

In August 1999 FBI and Justice Department officials disclosed that the FBI had fired pyrotechnic tear gas rounds on April 19. On September 9, 1999 Reno appointed former Senator John C. Danforth as Special Counsel under Order No. 2256-99 to determine whether government agents started or contributed to the fire, directed gunfire at the complex, used an incendiary or pyrotechnic device, illegally used the armed forces, or made false statements or withheld or destroyed evidence. His final report of November 8, 2000 concluded that government agents "did not start or materially contribute to the spread of the fire," that the Davidians spread accelerants and started fires in several locations, that the Davidians fired at FBI agents and killed some of their own people, including at least five children, and that the pyrotechnic rounds "did not start the fire"; it also concluded that certain FBI and Justice Department officials failed to disclose information about the pyrotechnic rounds until August 1999 and that some of them obstructed the investigation. The Special Counsel did not review whether the ATF raid or the gas insertion plan reflected good judgment.²