--- aliases: - Project Troy - Project TROY - TROY - Troy Report - Project Troy Report to the Secretary of State - Perforating the Iron Curtain category: Government Program created: 2026-10-09 end: 1951-02 location: Washington, D.C.; Cambridge, Massachusetts relations: - end: 1951-01 fn: 3 reverse: true role: participant; Bessner calls him a primary author of the report's sections on the Soviet Union start: 1950-10 type: participant_in with: '[[Hans Speier]]' - end: 1951-01 fn: 3 reverse: true role: director of the project start: 1950-10 type: participant_in with: '[[John Burchard]]' - end: 1951-01 fn: 4 reverse: true role: participant start: 1950-10 type: participant_in with: '[[Jerome B. Wiesner]]' - end: 1951-01 fn: 4 reverse: true role: participant; staffed the project start: 1950-10 type: participant_in with: '[[Edward Purcell]]' - end: 1951-01 fn: 4 reverse: true role: participant start: 1950-10 type: participant_in with: '[[Clyde Kluckhohn]]' - end: 1951-01 fn: 4 reverse: true role: participant start: 1950-10 type: participant_in with: '[[Lloyd Berkner]]' - end: 1951 fn: 6 reverse: true role: member of the study group, per MIT's finding aid for his papers and a CIA historian's interview note of March 5, 1952 start: 1950 type: participant_in with: '[[Max Millikan]]' - fn: 3 role: report to the Secretary of State dated February 1, 1951, received February 15 start: 1951-02 type: reported_to with: '[[Dean Acheson]]' - end: 1951-01 fn: 4 reverse: true role: participant (listed as A.G. Hill, MIT physicist) start: 1950-10 type: participant_in with: '[[Albert G. Hill]]' start: 1950-10 summary: Project Troy was a 1950-51 MIT study of Soviet jamming and political warfare, reporting to the Secretary of State, whose February 1951 report proposed radio, balloon and elite-directed campaigns behind the Iron Curtain. tags: - Program - ProjectTroy - PoliticalWarfare - PsychologicalWarfare - VoiceOfAmerica - SovietJamming - PsychologicalStrategyBoard - CenisMit - Balloons - Cia - ColdWar - 1950s updated: 2026-10-09 --- Project Troy was a study set up by the [Massachusetts Institute of Technology](/organizations/massachusetts-institute-of-technology/) in October 1950, under contract with the United States Government, to carry out investigations requested by the [State Department](/organizations/state-department/), with a group of about twenty participants. It began as an inquiry into Soviet jamming of the Voice of America and widened to cover other ways of reaching the populations of the Soviet bloc. Its report, dated February 1, 1951, proposed radio and balloon programs, a unified political warfare authority, and campaigns aimed at the Soviet political elite. The study was followed by the [Psychological Strategy Board](/organizations/psychological-strategy-board/) and by the [Center for International Studies](/organizations/center-for-international-studies/) at MIT. ### Origins The study grew out of a complaint about the Voice of America. On March 1, 1950, [Harry S. Truman](/people/harry-s-truman/) sent [Dean Acheson](/people/dean-acheson/) a memorandum recording a conversation with David Sarnoff, chairman of the Radio Corporation of America, who had proposed a committee to look into improving the Voice of America. Sarnoff suggested that the committee consist of himself, Brien McMahon, Ernest McFarland, Under Secretary of Defense Stephen Early and the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, Edward W. Barrett.[^1] Barrett's memorandum of March 2 proposed a wider effort to "penetrate the Iron Curtain" with ideas, through "all techniques and resources for communication of ideas behind the Iron Curtain," of which radio was one.[^1] His memorandum of March 6 recommended "a new high-level committee of Sarnoff, etc., to look for added means of getting the truth behind the Iron Curtain." The same memorandum said that the committee "would not confine itself to radio but would look into such proposals as the hardy perennial of utilizing balloons to drop leaflets."[^2] According to a note in the Foreign Relations volume, Acheson discussed the proposal with Truman on March 6 and informed him that Barrett was working on a plan for an advisory committee along the lines suggested by Sarnoff.[^2] Barrett later claimed that the conclusions of the April 1950 symposium described below helped him prepare Truman's Campaign of Truth speech.[^3] The historian Daniel Bessner argues that the chain continued as follows. Sarnoff's complaints led Truman to ask Acheson to investigate the Voice of America, and Acheson asked James E. Webb, the Under Secretary of State, and Barrett to examine its operations. In April 1950 Barrett organized a group of experts, among them [Hans Speier](/people/hans-speier/).[^3] That summer Webb contacted James Killian, president of MIT, and John Burchard, an MIT administrator, about hosting social scientists to study Soviet jamming of American radio transmissions. Killian and Burchard accepted, and Burchard agreed to direct the project.[^3] ### The MIT study The project was staffed through Edward Purcell, a [Harvard University](/organizations/harvard-university/) physicist who had worked at the MIT Radiation Laboratory during the war and who, Bessner says, "likely knew a number of RAND analysts."[^4] The participants met in Washington in October 1950 and then in Cambridge, Massachusetts, until January 1951.[^4] The participants included Dana K. Bailey of the National Bureau of Standards, Alex Bavelas, Lloyd Berkner of the Carnegie Institution of Washington, Jerome S. Bruner of Harvard, Burchard of MIT, Martin Deutsch, Francis L. Friedman, A. G. Hill, Burnham Kelly, Clyde Kluckhohn of Harvard, Elting E. Morison, Robert S. Morison of the [Rockefeller Foundation](/organizations/rockefeller-foundation/), John A. Morrison, John R. Pierce, Winfield W. Salisbury, Speier, Merle A. Tuve, [Jerome B. Wiesner](/people/jerome-b-wiesner/) and Robert L. Wolff.[^4] Hill, listed as "A.G. Hill; (MIT, Physicist)," directed the MIT Research Laboratory of Electronics from 1949 to 1952 and the MIT Lincoln Laboratory from 1952 to 1955.[^5] [McGeorge Bundy](/people/mcgeorge-bundy/), Robert Merton and [George Kennan](/people/george-kennan/) were asked to take part and could not, because of other commitments.[^4] [Max Millikan](/people/max-millikan/), an MIT economist, was also a member of the study group: MIT's biographical note for his papers describes Project TROY as "a study group (of which Millikan was a member) contracted by the Department of State in 1950," and a CIA historian's interview note of March 5, 1952 records that "Millikan participated in a 'contract study,' State and MIT."[^6][^7] He does not appear in the participant list printed by Bessner.[^4] The report's foreword says the project was set up by MIT "as the means for carrying out, under contract with the United States Government, investigations requested by the Department of State." It describes a full-time ad hoc group "relieved of other duties" for about three months, divided into cross-disciplinary panels whose drafts were discussed and amended by the whole group, with an Editorial Committee at the end. The main report carried no individual authorship. Because the annexes "have not been subjected to plenary scrutiny," each annex "bears the names of members of the sub-group responsible for it."[^8] A 2016 Virginia Tech dissertation, citing Needell, counts twenty-one scientists, social scientists and historians, and reports that Congress declined to appropriate funds for the "Ring Plan" of radio transmitters the Troy group recommended in 1951 and 1952.[^9] ### The February 1951 report The report was addressed to the Secretary of State and dated February 1, 1951. Acheson received it on February 15.[^3] A third progress report on NSC 59/1, undated in the Foreign Relations volume, described Troy as a study "initiated in October 1950" in which the Massachusetts Institute of Technology "assembled 30 of the nation's top scientists" to examine means of penetrating the Iron Curtain. It said the report "proposed technical means to get around Soviet jamming of VOA and ideas for political and psychological warfare."[^10] The foreword said the first study had been aimed at the technical problems of the Voice of America under jamming, and that the group had agreed to examine other means of penetrating the Iron Curtain. Its authors wrote: "The newness of our idea, if any, lies in the understanding of the strategic power of the several elements when combined as a well rounded and coordinated whole." They added that "the idea that the United States must develop a coordinated political warfare effort is the most important idea in the report."[^11] The report urged that political warfare "should be organized like any form of warfare, with specialized weapons, strategy, tactics, logistics, and training."[^11] ### The radio and balloon chapters The radio chapter treated the jamming as a problem extending beyond the Voice of America. Its authors wrote that "The Russian jamming operation seems to us to have clear and serious implications extending beyond the immediate problems of the Voice of America."[^11] The CIA excerpt puts the number of jamming transmitters at "at least several hundred, possibly a thousand."[^8] Robert Hooker's summary of the report gives the range as "a hundred, perhaps a thousand," and says the transmitters "appear to be centrally controlled."[^11] The report recommended a "coherent transmitter" array of ten one-megawatt units, which it said "cannot easily be jammed over a large area" and "could reach most of Eastern Europe at night" if well located.[^11] It also recommended "a concerted effort to develop crystal and transistor receivers for mass production."[^11] The authors wrote that "If our high-frequency transmissions were jammed (they could be jammed tomorrow) and the Atlantic cables cut by submarine action, air mail would be our only means of communication with Europe."[^11] They called for an engineering study of a transatlantic channel secure against jamming, and concluded that "The challenge of the electro-magnetic war is serious and we are not organized to meet it."[^11] A vest-pocket radio built around a transistor was reported in November 1951 as being developed "along the lines recommended by the group."[^12] The report treated balloons as a separate part of the program. Hooker's summary quotes its estimate that "An area of a million square miles could be saturated with a billion propaganda sheets in a single balloon operation costing a few million dollars." The same summary gives "about one million dollars" as the cost of an operational test.[^11] The CIA excerpt states the central recommendation directly: "The balloon problem is a part of political warfare. It cannot be handled by a separate balloon shop." It recommended that organizational planning for leaflet preparation, stockpiling and site selection start at once, that a full operational test be planned, and that development continue on gas bags, flight equipment, meteorological background and gas supply.[^8] On May 2, 1951, Barrett's memorandum to [Paul Nitze](/people/paul-nitze/) listed the plans developed as a result of Project Troy among the State Department's psychological activities, and described the report as having "made various proposals for political warfare, including possible methods of minimizing the effects of Soviet jamming on the Voice of America broadcasts."[^13] ### The political warfare chapters The chapter on the Soviet Union was the most specific part of the report, as Hooker summarized it. Its principal targets were "the intelligentsia, skilled workers, bureaucrats, personnel of the mechanized armed forces, rural areas." The report proposed "deterioration in administrative structure" by "overloading the system with material introduced from outside," and "stimulating mutual distrust by artificial means, bogus letters, etc."[^11] Its overload annex directed attack at "those weaknesses which could not be corrected without seriously reducing the power held by those few at the top."[^11] The Soviet chapter also recommended that propaganda avoid any "implication of contempt for communism," and stated that "Discord in the United States is not only tolerable but actually necessary."[^11] It advised against setting "the non-Party people being set off against the Party members."[^11] Annex 12 on defectors stated that "A third (at least) of the defectors had Party and/or Komsomol membership," and that this "militates strongly against the contention that defectors overwhelmingly represent the rejects of Soviet society."[^14] The printed volume marks passages of that annex as not declassified.[^14] Annex 15 proposed planning for the death of Stalin, arguing that "Since Stalin's death offers the best opportunity for exploiting the fear and self-interest of the Soviet elite," and proposed "a special section" to "concentrate exclusively on this task."[^11] Annex 13 on forward planning recommended a study of the effect of prolonged preparedness on American society. Hooker added a bracketed comment that "This might well be a desirable project for the Ford Foundation to undertake."[^11] The conclusion asked for "some single authority concerned with political warfare exclusively, with the capacity to design a comprehensive program and the power to obtain execution of this program."[^11] Annex 11 recommended research on the political control systems used to influence "groups holding or seeking power," on the social structure of target areas, and on the attitudes of target populations.[^11] ### Reception in the State Department Hooker, of the Policy Planning Staff, sent a memorandum to Nitze on March 26, 1951. It said that "The Troy Report almost uniformly reflects a very high order of technical competence, political sophistication, and common sense. It deserves the most serious consideration." Hooker found that the principles and techniques for political warfare laid down in the report, "with few exceptions, seem worthy of adoption."[^11] The same day Armstrong, of the Department, wrote to Barrett that the report showed "its appreciation of the nature of political warfare," while criticizing its "over-all substantive approach."[^11] Nitze's memorandum to Webb of April 9, 1951 rejected the use of the report as a frame of reference for a new board. "The Troy group went vastly beyond its original terms of reference and explored a field for which it had no special competence and about which it had little information." He wrote that "In effect it proposed a new board to take over the jurisdiction of all the agencies operating in the foreign field, of the NSC, and in part of the President himself."[^15] Nitze wrote that Barrett's memorandum of March 29, 1951 envisaged the board "as operating as a central authority on political warfare" "as recommended by the Troy group."[^15] Bessner reports that State officials praised the report as an "extraordinary piece of work" that "blazed important new paths," a phrase he takes from Allan Needell.[^16] ### The Psychological Strategy Board President Truman's directive of April 4, 1951 established the Psychological Strategy Board to promote "more effective planning, coordination and conduct, within the framework of approved national policies, of psychological operations." The board consisted of the Under Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of [Department of Defense](/organizations/department-of-defense/) and the Director of Central Intelligence, and it reported to the [National Security Council](/organizations/national-security-council/). Gordon Gray was its first director.[^17] The directive also stated that "This directive does not authorize the Board nor the Director to perform any 'psychological operations'."[^17] The State Department had argued that a department member should chair the board. Webb wrote on March 15 that it was "impossible … to entrust the formulation and execution of policies and programs of political warfare to an agency not subject or subordinate to the Department of State."[^17] Daniel Bessner argues that Speier's Troy participation gave him a channel into State Department policy, and that PSB directive D-31 of November 26, 1952 endorsed three of Speier's arguments about the Soviet political structure.[^18] D-31, "A Strategic Concept for a National Psychological Program," called for increasing "suspicion [between Soviet and communist elites] to the point of systematic removal or elimination of personnel in important and effective positions." Bessner says the paper also described breeding distrust as a way to "disrupt the system" of Soviet rule.[^18] The third progress report on NSC 59/1 recorded that the CIA "has been assigned the project of a continuing study in this field" of balloons and "has also been instructed to stockpile one thousand large-sized propaganda balloons of the best type presently available."[^10] In February 1953 CIA memoranda discussed a "Friendship-Balloon Lift," which Bessner cites from the files of the Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library.[^19] On November 1, 1951 Gordon Gray, as Director of the Board, wrote to [Allen Dulles](/people/allen-dulles/) that Dr. [Julius A. Stratton](/people/julius-a-stratton/) of MIT, described in the letter as "Provost of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Director of the Center of International Studies," would present the program of the Center to the Board and its staff on November 7, and that the Center was "a continuation on an established basis of the work recommended by the Troy Report."[^20] ### The Center for International Studies Bessner writes that the Center for International Studies, known as CENIS, "emerged from Project TROY." James Killian, pleased with the outcome, organized a second phase with four research initiatives. One of them concerned a State Department-funded institute similar to one that Donald Marquis had recommended in Annex 11 of the report.[^21] CENIS began operating in the fall of 1951. MIT's biographical note for the papers of its first director states that the center, "established in January 1952, continued the contract work undertaken for the government under Project TROY."[^6] In February 1952 Max Millikan, an economist who had spent a year at the CIA, accepted the offer to serve as its first director.[^21] The center's own history states that it "was founded in 1951 in response to the Cold War struggles between the United States and the Soviet Union," and that in 1952 "a young MIT economist named Max F Millikan became the Center's first director."[^22] Millikan's CIA service is recorded in agency documents. In a letter stamped January 30, 1951 he wrote that he had "gone on leave from MIT to head up the Office of Research and Reports in this Agency," whose mission had been "focused much more sharply on economic matters."[^23] A memorandum of conversation dated January 22, 1951 lists "Dr. Max Millikan, Central Intelligence Agency" among the participants in a discussion of psychological intelligence with State Department officers, including the intelligence support to be given to the Office of Policy Coordination in the psychological field, and records his concern that placing the production of that intelligence in several organizations would bring "the shortcomings of decentralization."[^24] A memorandum of March 6, 1951, sent to the intelligence chiefs of State, the Army, the Navy and the Air Force "for the Director of Central Intelligence," carries his typed name as Assistant Director, Research and Reports.[^25] On October 29, 1951 he wrote to a prospective recruit that for "the last nine or ten months" he had been "trying to put together for General Smith an organization to do economic research," on a leave of absence from MIT.[^26] A letter he signed as AD/RR on November 26, 1951 tells its addressee, whose name is redacted, that "Walt Rostow at the Center for International Studies has sought my assistance in finding him someone to help out with some research."[^27] A letter of March 3, 1952 addresses him as Special Consultant, Central Intelligence Agency.[^28] A CIA historian's note of an interview with Millikan on March 5, 1952, titled "Origin of PSB," records that the stream "which seems to have flown directly to the creation of the PSB in the early part of 1951" was the "Troy Project," and that "Millikan participated in a 'contract study,' State and MIT, in the fall of 1951," a date corrected by hand to 1950. The note says the study's objective "was to find some means of penetrating the 'Iron Curtain,'" that "The men in Cambridge spent some three months," and that "Secretary Webb was much impressed with the report." It records Millikan's statement that "the best way into the problem proved to be through the 'defectors,'" and that the study's recommendation to the State Department "had considerable to do with the creation of the PSB." The interviewer, A. B. Darling, also recorded Millikan's account of an earlier Board under Barrett, with [Frank Wisner](/people/frank-wisner/) of the Office of Policy Coordination, Admiral Stevens from the Pentagon and others, and a staff called "IFIS" located in State.[^7] Bessner says that soon after Millikan arrived at the center he asked Gaither of the [Ford Foundation](/organizations/ford-foundation/) for money. When Speier learned of the request, he visited Millikan in February 1952 to discuss a center for research in international communication. Millikan was reticent, believing that MIT's comparative advantage lay in economic and political studies, but Speier "convinced him otherwise." Bessner attributes the Ford trustees' grant of $875,000 to CENIS in the spring of 1952 to Speier's efforts.[^21] Funding from the CIA is recorded in several places. Patrick Oster of the Chicago Sun-Times reported in the [Washington Post](/organizations/washington-post/) of September 11, 1977 that "The Central Intelligence Agency secretly financed a research project at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in order to gain data on how to turn Russian scientists into CIA agents." The article said that, "As part of its Project MK-ULTRA," the agency, "using a private foundation as a 'front,'" spent a total of $12,000 in 1958 and 1959 on determining "what criteria can be developed in spotting and assessing [Soviet scientists] as potential agent recruits," according to CIA memos the Sun-Times had obtained. It named the researcher as Anthony J. Wiener, "who at the time was affiliated with MIT's Center for International Studies, which was set up in 1951 with CIA money and had as its first director Max F. Millikan, a former assistant director of the agency," and said Wiener, later a consultant to the Hudson Institute, "was apparently an unwitting pawn in the CIA's mind-control project." The research, which "relied heavily on interviews with American and Western scientists returning from the Soviet Union," was financed by the [Society for the Investigation of Human Ecology](/organizations/society-for-the-investigation-of-human-ecology/), which the article called "a New York-based CIA front." A CIA memo of September 17, 1958 quoted there gave the purpose as guidance on "the most effective way or ways in which repressed and rationalized anti-regime motivations may be aroused or, more properly, re-activated," and said the projects would "sharpen our sights and methods as respects the spotting, development and recruitment of selected types of citizens."[^29] [Time](/organizations/time/) of February 24, 1967, in a passage on the agency's use of university specialists, reported "directly and without masquerade" "$300,000 to finance M.I.T.'s topflight Center for International Studies," and that "Until last spring, M.I.T. continued to accept agency funds, then terminated the contract 'for practical, not moral reasons.'" It quoted Millikan, described as "the sage director of M.I.T.'s International Center," saying: "The number of my friends around here who have swallowed this 'invisible government' line is disturbing."[^30] Asked by the [Senate Judiciary Committee](/organizations/senate-judiciary-committee/)'s Internal Security Subcommittee whether he had ever been connected with the CIA, Andreas Lowenfeld, of the State Department's Office of Legal Adviser, answered: "Not in any direct way. The reason that I hesitate in my answer is that I was connected with the Center for International Studies at MIT." Asked the period, he said: "That was 1951-1952. And they had some kind of contract with the CIA. So that it is conceivable that I was cleared with them." He added: "But I never formally worked for them." Asked "Did you know that the Center for International Studies was a CIA operation?" he answered: "I was never formally told, but it became apparent." Asked whether Rostow was in charge when he was there, he answered: "He was acting, I guess … and then Mr. Millikan came. I worked for Mr. Rostow, yes." He described himself as a staff member, one of "only three or four staff members" at first, who "worked on various projects having to do with Russia and Eastern Europe."[^31] In February 1961 Allen W. Dulles wrote to Millikan, as director of the center, that he was "very deeply interested in the proposal in your letter of January 23," and that he expected to attend at least part of the meetings of May 18 to 21, 1961, when Millikan would review the center's first ten years.[^32] ### Lexington and related studies The historian Daniel Bessner describes Troy as an outgrowth of earlier summer studies. He names an Air Force summer study codenamed LEXINGTON, which examined a nuclear-powered airplane, and a Navy study codenamed HARTWELL, which examined how the United States could avoid Soviet submarines.[^33] James Killian's 1954 statement at the [Atomic Energy Commission](/organizations/atomic-energy-commission/) hearings on [J. Robert Oppenheimer](/people/j-robert-oppenheimer/) gives a different account of Lexington. He called it "an earlier project, known as Project Lexington, carried out by the Atomic Energy Commission under contract with M.I.T.," and named Walter Whitman as its director. The same statement describes a 1952 summer study of the Lincoln Laboratory, in which Oppenheimer briefed the group on atomic warfare, and whose recommendations went to the Department of Defense on strengthening defenses against air attack.[^34] Lexington Project Report 175, "Polonium-Powered Aircraft for Military Purposes," by A. R. Kaufmann of MIT, is dated September 28, 1948.[^35] ### Declassification The CIA reading room holds an excerpt of the report, titled "Excerpts From Project Troy Report to the Secretary of State, February 1, 1951." It is marked Top Secret, carries the notation "Approved For Release 2000/08/29," and states that it contains "excerpts from or summarizations of portions of the subject report." It also carries the notation "State Dept, declassification & release instructions on file."[^8] The Foreign Relations volume for 1950 to 1955 cites the report's copies in State Department files. Its footnote names a copy in the historical files of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, RG 59, Lot 58 D 776, under the title "Project Troy, Perforating the Iron Curtain," with further documentation in the Central Files.[^10] The Foreign Relations volume for 1951 records the report as "not printed."[^13] Bessner cites a copy in RG 59, Lot 52-283, at the National Archives II.[^4] [^1]: U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1950, volume IV, Document 127 (Truman to Acheson, March 1, 1950) and Document 128 (Barrett to Acheson, March 2, 1950). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950v04/d127 and https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950v04/d128 [^2]: FRUS 1950, volume IV, Document 131 (Barrett to Acheson, March 6, 1950) and the editorial note on Acheson's discussion with Truman on March 6, 1950. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950v04/d131 [^3]: Daniel Morris Bessner, "The Night Watchman: Hans Speier and the Making of the American National Security State" (PhD diss., Duke University, 2013), pp. 236 to 238 and notes 37 to 40, including note 38 on p. 237 (Barrett's later claim about the Campaign of Truth speech). https://dukespace.lib.duke.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/232a76ac-f2d8-4827-99fe-50b3b109fa6c/content [^4]: Bessner, "The Night Watchman," p. 237 (Purcell, the dates in Washington and Cambridge, and the RAND remark), p. 238 and note 41 (participant list, which also records that Needell incorrectly lists Speier as a political scientist; Bundy, Merton and Kennan were asked and could not take part), and note 37 (report copy in RG 59, Lot 52-283). https://dukespace.lib.duke.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/232a76ac-f2d8-4827-99fe-50b3b109fa6c/content [^5]: "Albert G. Hill Dies at 86," MIT News, October 25, 1996. https://news.mit.edu/1996/hill [^6]: MIT Libraries, Department of Distinctive Collections, Max F. Millikan papers (MC-0188), biographical note. https://archivesspace.mit.edu/repositories/2/resources/722 [^7]: A. B. Darling, note of interview with Max Millikan, "Origin of PSB," March 5, 1952, file HS/CSG-556, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP83-00036R000400050039-0. The typed text reads "fall of 1951"; a handwritten "1950" appears beside it. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp83-00036r000400050039-0 [^8]: CIA, "Excerpts From Project Troy Report to the Secretary of State, February 1, 1951," CIA reading room document CIA-RDP79S01011A000900030019-8 (Top Secret; "Approved For Release 2000/08/29"). https://archive.org/details/CIA-RDP79S01011A000900030019-8 [^9]: Sonya Lynn Finley, "Recommending Political Warfare: The Role of Eisenhower's Presidential Committee on International Information Activities in the United States' Approach to the Cold War" (PhD diss., Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 2016), citing Needell, Diplomatic History 17, no. 3 (1993), p. 400, and Krugler (2000). The Ring Plan details are Finley's. https://vtechworks.lib.vt.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/fad04742-5d02-47ca-8d6c-44f692d790a6/content [^10]: FRUS, The Intelligence Community, 1950-1955, Document 57 (third progress report on NSC 59/1, undated), paragraph 8 and its footnote 5 on the Troy report, and paragraph 12 on balloons. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950-55Intel/d57 [^11]: FRUS, The Intelligence Community, 1950-1955, Document 59 (Robert J. Hooker to Paul Nitze, March 26, 1951, with the highlights of the Troy report and its annexes). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950-55Intel/d59 [^12]: FRUS, The Intelligence Community, 1950-1955, Document 92 (Webb memorandum, November 8, 1951). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950-55Intel/d92 [^13]: FRUS, 1951, volume I, Document 326 (Barrett to Nitze, May 2, 1951), and its editorial note that the report was "not printed." https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951v01/d326 [^14]: FRUS, The Intelligence Community, 1950-1955, Document 59, Annex 12 (Defectors), with the bracketed "not declassified" notations in the same passage. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950-55Intel/d59 [^15]: FRUS, The Intelligence Community, 1950-1955, Document 62 (Nitze to Webb, April 9, 1951), and the Barrett memorandum of March 29, 1951 quoted in it ("as recommended by the Troy group"). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950-55Intel/d62 [^16]: Bessner, "The Night Watchman," p. 239 and note 49, quoting Allan A. Needell, "'Truth Is Our Weapon': Project TROY, Political Warfare, and Government-Academic Relations in the National Security State," Diplomatic History 17, no. 3 (July 1993), pp. 413 to 414. [^17]: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, vol. I, Document 16, Directive by the President to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of Central Intelligence, April 4, 1951, pp. 58-60. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951v01/d16 Also Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950-1955, The Intelligence Community, Document 60, editorial note, citing Webb to the Director, Bureau of the Budget, March 15, 1951 (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950-54, 100.4 PSB/4-451). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950-55Intel/d60 [^18]: Bessner, "The Night Watchman," p. 17 (Speier's influence on PSB tactical directives), and pp. 240 and note 52 (PSB D-31, "A Strategic Concept for a National Psychological Program with Particular Reference to Cold War Operations under NSC-10/5," November 26, 1952, RG 59, S/S-NSC Files, Lot 62 D 333). https://dukespace.lib.duke.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/232a76ac-f2d8-4827-99fe-50b3b109fa6c/content [^19]: Bessner, "The Night Watchman," p. 240 and note 50 (CIA memoranda of February 10, 17 and 25, 1953 on "The Friendship-Balloon Lift," Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, National Security Council Staff Papers, PSB Central Files, Box 28, PSB 452.4). [^20]: Central Intelligence Agency, letter from Gordon Gray, Director, Psychological Strategy Board, to Allen Dulles, November 1, 1951. CIA reading room copy, CIA-RDP80R01731R003300410041-0. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp80r01731r003300410041-0 [^21]: Bessner, "The Night Watchman," p. 255 (CENIS and the Troy origin, Killian's second phase, Marquis and Annex 11, and the fall 1951 start), pp. 256 and notes 107 to 109 (Millikan's request to Gaither, Speier's February 1952 visit, the Ford grant), citing Donald L. M. Blackmer, The MIT Center for International Studies: The Founding Years, 1951 to 1969 (Cambridge: MIT Center for International Studies, 2002), pp. 36 to 42 and p. 38, as cited there. [^22]: MIT Center for International Studies, "History" (Origins of the Center). https://cis.mit.edu/history [^23]: Max F. Millikan, letter stamped "JAN 30 1951" (addressee illegible in the reading-room copy), CIA reading room document CIA-RDP80R01731R003100150032-1. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp80r01731r003100150032-1 [^24]: CIA, memorandum of conversation, "Psychological Intelligence," January 22, 1951, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP80R01731R003500180026-1. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp80r01731r003500180026-1 [^25]: CIA, "Report of Intelligence Project Initiations, February 1951," memorandum of March 6, 1951, signed "For the Director of Central Intelligence" by Max F. Millikan, Assistant Director, Research and Reports, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP60-00213A000200030008-3. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp60-00213a000200030008-3 [^26]: Max F. Millikan, letter of October 29, 1951 (recipient redacted), CIA reading room document CIA-RDP79-01157A000200020002-2. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp79-01157a000200020002-2 [^27]: Max F. Millikan, letter of November 26, 1951 (typed signature block; file notation AD/RR:MFMillikan; addressee redacted), CIA reading room document CIA-RDP80R01731R003000200096-6. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp80r01731r003000200096-6 [^28]: Stuart A. Rice, Assistant Director for Statistical Standards, Bureau of the Budget, letter to Max F. Millikan, March 3, 1952, addressing him as Special Consultant, Central Intelligence Agency, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP75-00662R000300120004-5. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp75-00662r000300120004-5 [^29]: Patrick Oster, "CIA Envisioned Soviet Scientists as U.S. Agents," Chicago Sun-Times, reprinted in the Washington Post, September 11, 1977, p. A-9, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP88-01315R000400460003-8. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp88-01315r000400460003-8 [^30]: Time, February 24, 1967, vol. 89, no. 8, The Nation, pp. 15 to 16 (the opening words of the sentence on the $300,000 fall at the foot of p. 15), CIA reading room document CIA-RDP84-00161R000400210135-8, passage on the center. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp84-00161r000400210135-8 [^31]: U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Internal Security Subcommittee, extracts from hearings (Part 3) on State Department security and passport regulations, testimony of Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Office of Legal Adviser, State Department (Part 3, pp. 331 to 332), CIA reading room document CIA-RDP75-00149R000400560007-3. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp75-00149r000400560007-3 [^32]: Allen W. Dulles, letter to Max F. Millikan, Director, Center for International Studies, February 27, 1961, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP80B01676R003500160028-9. Dulles's note of February 16, 1961, which acknowledges the letter of January 23, and Millikan's letter of March 2, 1961 thanking Dulles for it, are in CIA-RDP80B01676R003500160036-0. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp80b01676r003500160028-9 [^33]: Bessner, "The Night Watchman," p. 237 and note 40 (Troy as an outgrowth of the Air Force and Navy summer studies, LEXINGTON and HARTWELL). [^34]: James R. Killian, Jr., affidavit in the 1954 Atomic Energy Commission personnel security hearings on J. Robert Oppenheimer, as quoted in an article reproduced in CIA reading room document CIA-RDP64B00346R000200100018-4. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp64b00346r000200100018-4 [^35]: A. R. Kaufmann, Lexington Project Report 175, "Polonium-Powered Aircraft for Military Purposes" (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, September 28, 1948), OSTI ID 969802. https://www.osti.gov/biblio/969802 --- *The Info Web has an MCP server for agents at https://theinfoweb.org/mcp (streamable HTTP, no auth): search by meaning, exact text, source or date, and follow typed, footnoted connections. Setup and the same tools over GET: https://theinfoweb.org/llms.txt*