Vernon Walters

Vernon Anthony Walters (January 3, 1917 - February 10, 2002) was the US Army attaché in Brazil from 1962 to 1967, including the period of the military coup that overthrew President Joao Goulart, and later served as Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (DDCI) under President Richard Nixon from May 2, 1972 to July 2, 1976. His role in the 1964 Brazilian coup was the most consequential of his long career as a military diplomat and intelligence officer, and illustrated the importance of personal relationships, cultivated over years, in enabling US-backed coups without direct US military intervention.¹

Born in New York City and educated partly in Europe, Walters was fluent in seven languages: French, Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, German, Russian, and Dutch, a capability that made him an indispensable interpreter for US presidents and senior officials across three decades.² He died in West Palm Beach, Florida on February 10, 2002, and was buried at Arlington National Cemetery.

World War II and the Brazilian Generals

Walters enlisted in the US Army in 1941 and trained at Camp Ritchie as a military intelligence officer. His consequential assignment came in 1944-1945, when he served as combat liaison officer between the Brazilian Expeditionary Force (FEB) and General Mark Clark's US Fifth Army in Italy. In this role he built close personal bonds with Brazilian officers including General Mascarenhas de Moraes and the younger officers serving under him, bonds that would prove decisive two decades later.³

After the war, Walters served as aide to W. Averell Harriman at Marshall Plan headquarters in Paris, then helped establish NATO Supreme Headquarters in 1951. During the 1950s he served as aide and interpreter to Presidents Harry Truman and Dwight Eisenhower at international summits. In 1958 he was present in Caracas, Venezuela during the attack on Vice President Nixon's motorcade and suffered facial cuts in the incident.⁴

Appointment to Brazil and Pre-Coup Intelligence

Walters returned to Brazil on October 10, 1962, designated as US Military Attaché at the Embassy in Rio de Janeiro under Ambassador Lincoln Gordon, at Gordon's specific recommendation. His unique asset was his long-standing personal friendship with the Brazilian generals who would lead the 1964 coup, particularly General Humberto Castelo Branco, who by 1964 had risen to Army Chief of Staff and would become the coup's first military president.⁵

The documentary record of Walters's pre-coup intelligence work opens in the NSA Electronic Briefing Book No. 465, "Brazil Marks 50th Anniversary of Military Coup," compiled by James G. Hershberg and Peter Kornbluh of the National Security Archive. Document 1 of that collection, a White House transcript from July 30, 1962, records the Kennedy administration's decision to appoint Walters specifically to strengthen contacts with Brazilian military leadership.⁶

On the evening of March 13, 1964, Walters was present at Castelo Branco's residence in Rio when they watched together on television President Goulart's inflammatory speech at a military rally. It was one of the moments at which Castelo Branco made political remarks to Walters, confirming the gravity of the officers' opposition to Goulart's direction.⁷

By March 23, 1964, Walters had alerted Ambassador Gordon to active coup plotting among the generals. His intelligence reached Washington in a series of cables routed through both State Department and military channels. FRUS 1964-68, Vol. XXXI, Document 186 (March 26, 1964), a telegram from the Embassy to the State Department, reflects information reported independently by Walters: that coup conspirators "had agreed on seven grounds that could trigger a revolt." The document notes that when Walters was asked about US assistance, he replied he had "no authority to discuss such matters" and had "passed information on to Ambassador who is taking matter up at highest levels."⁸

The March 30 Cable and Operation Brother Sam

The most operationally significant of Walters's pre-coup communications was his cable to the Department of the Army on March 30, 1964, FRUS 1964-68, Vol. XXXI, Document 192, addressed to the Defense Intelligence Agency, CINCSO, and COMUSARSO, with Ambassador Gordon's handwritten annotation requesting that all recipients of Gordon's messages also see this one. The cable reported on Walters's contacts with coup plotters, including General Ulhoa Cintra, and detailed troop mobilizations. Its core intelligence was that the conspirators had committed to action: "It had been decided to take action this week on a signal to be issued later." Walters added that he expected to be made "aware beforehand of go signal."⁹

That same day, March 30, Walters also transmitted intelligence through Joint Chiefs of Staff channels, reported in NSAEBB 465, Document 13, confirming the same operational timetable. The coup began on March 31, 1964 - within one week of Walters's prediction, and as he had forecast, he received advance notice before it started.¹⁰

When Operation Brother Sam, the US naval task force dispatched to Brazilian waters in late March 1964, was assembled, Walters's assessments of the reliability of the coup commanders and the military balance of forces informed the Johnson administration's confidence that direct naval intervention would not be needed. The task force code name was formally assigned by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in a State Department cable dated March 31, 1964, FRUS 1964-68, Vol. XXXI, Document 198.¹¹

Walters was one of the three principal US operational coordinators of the coup alongside Ambassador Gordon and J.C. King of the CIA. Gordon's role was diplomatic and political; King's was intelligence coordination; Walters's was direct personal communication with coup commanders. The combination ensured that the Johnson administration had real-time intelligence on coup preparations and could calibrate US support accordingly.¹²

After the coup succeeded on April 1, 1964, Walters helped facilitate the early US diplomatic recognition of the military junta. His relationships with the new government's leadership made him the natural interlocutor for the delicate early phase of US-junta relations. He was promoted to Brigadier General in 1965 and elevated to Defense Attaché that same year, remaining in Brazil until 1967.¹³

CIA Deputy Director and Watergate

President Nixon appointed Walters Deputy Director of Central Intelligence on May 2, 1972, promoting him to Lieutenant General at the same time. Walters served as Acting Director of Central Intelligence from July 2 to September 4, 1973, during James Schlesinger's transition period.

Walters's appointment placed him at the CIA at the precise moment the Watergate scandal was breaking. On June 23, 1972, six days after the Watergate break-in, Nixon directed chief of staff H.R. Haldeman to instruct CIA Director Richard Helms and Walters to tell acting FBI Director L. Patrick Gray to stay out of the Watergate investigation on grounds of national security. Helms and Walters were called to a White House meeting with Haldeman and John Ehrlichman on June 23, where Haldeman relayed the instruction: "Stay the hell out of this." This conversation, captured on White House audio tape, became the "smoking gun" tape that destroyed Nixon's presidency when it became public on August 5, 1974.¹⁴

Walters did meet with Gray and initially asked him to go slow on the Mexican money-laundering connection, but when Gray demanded a written declaration that a CIA operation in Mexico could be compromised by further investigation, Walters replied that he could not supply this "because it would not be true." He delivered a three-page memo, marked Secret, that did not in fact ask the FBI to halt its interviews.¹⁵

Subsequently, counsel John Dean approached Walters asking the CIA to provide funds as hush money for the Watergate burglars. Walters refused. A memorandum from Director Helms to Walters, dated June 28, 1972, addressed the Watergate affair and became significant in later congressional investigations. Walters met again with Gray on July 12, 1972, to discuss CIA assistance previously provided to retired CIA officer E. Howard Hunt of the White House "Plumbers" unit. Walters documented the approaches made to him in a series of memoranda that were subsequently presented as evidence before the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities.¹⁶

Walters later stated he had "flatly refused" to involve the CIA and had informed "the highest levels of the executive branch" that further pressure would result in his immediate resignation.

Chile and the DINA Connection

As DDCI, Walters was not limited to the Watergate crisis. In mid-February 1974, he secretly traveled to Santiago, Chile to meet with General Augusto Pinochet following the September 1973 coup. In a cable classified Secret and addressed personally to Henry Kissinger, dated February 14, 1974, Walters reported conveying "greetings from the President and Secretary" and "friendship and support and our wish to be helpful in a discreet way." Pinochet accepted the CIA's offer of assistance and specifically requested support for his newly established secret police service, DINA, and its director, Colonel Manuel Contreras, described as "his key man." Walters reported telling Pinochet: "I told him we would be glad to have Contreras or anyone else come up to see us to see what we could do to be of assistance to them."¹⁷

Three weeks after the Walters-Pinochet meeting, Contreras traveled to CIA headquarters at Langley for briefings on intelligence service organization. Contreras met with Walters twice in Washington, in 1974 and 1975, during the period when Walters was second-in-command at the Agency. In mid-1975, the CIA briefly placed Contreras on its payroll as a paid asset. DINA subsequently became the primary instrument of the Pinochet regime's repression, responsible for torture centers, extrajudicial executions, forced disappearances, and international terrorism including the Letelier assassination in Washington in 1976.¹⁸

On Saturday, July 5, 1975, Walters met Contreras secretly at a CIA office at Fort Myer. He reported that Contreras asked how Chile might obtain American arms despite the congressional ban: "Wonder if there is any way they could get it indirectly via Spain, Brazil, or the Republic of Korea." They lunched at Langley on August 25. Ambassador David Popper had advised that publicity "could be counterproductive" but that "it would be worthwhile if General Walters could give Contreras a little time." Walters told the FBI in 1979 that "part of his function as deputy director of the CIA was to coordinate and conduct foreign liaison," and that he had received Contreras in that capacity. Contreras said from prison in 1999 that Walters had proposed placing CIA officers inside DINA and hiring five retired senators as lobbyists for Chile at two million dollars a year.¹⁹

In June 1976 Walters went to Paraguay to remove the CIA station chief, who had deceived Ambassador George Landau, and to ask the government of General Alfredo Stroessner not to kill a Paraguayan agent of the CIA who had been arrested and tortured. He was received by Stroessner's aide Conrado Pappalardo and left in the last week of June with the agent still in prison. In July Pappalardo asked Landau for American visas in false Paraguayan passports for two Chilean officers, saying that they were to contact Walters in Washington. Landau told Walters that the request appeared to be "the quid pro quo that Paraguay was demanding in exchange for sparing the CIA agent's life," issued the visas, and sent photographs of the passports to Walters through the State Department's "Roger Channel" on July 28. Walters was on leave in Florida before retirement, and the cable went to Director George Bush. On August 4 Walters replied that he had made no arrangement with Pappalardo, that he and Bush "had agreed that the agency wanted nothing to do with the DINA matter," and that the request was "highly irregular" and "a strange way of doing business." Two DINA captains using the same false names reached Washington on August 22 and had the Chilean embassy telephone Walters's office at Langley. The CIA did not tell the prosecutor of the Letelier murder, Eugene Propper, of any of this when it began sending him files that fall.²⁰

One of the two, Captain René Riveros Valderrama, gave a sworn statement in Santiago on March 22, 1978, to the Chilean court investigating Contreras and Espinoza. He and Captain Rolando Mosqueira Jarpa had left for Washington on August 21, 1976, on official passports in the names Juan Williams Rose and Alejandro Romeral Jara, prepared by DINA's passport section, on a mission given them by Contreras "to make contact with the North American General Don Vernon Walters in order to receive certain information relating to the names of certain persons." They could not reach him: he was handing over his post and on leave, and "finally a CIA secretary whom we could not identify told us that General Walters no longer worked at that intelligence agency." They then called on a Chilean general Mosqueira knew, giving their real names and ranks but not their errand, and when every approach failed telephoned Espinoza, DINA's chief of operations, who authorized them to return.²¹

Contreras told the Chilean military prosecutor on March 22, 1978, that "around June or early July 1976, CIA Chile informed me that the Deputy Director of the CIA, General Vernon Walters, needed a contact in the US to give us a list of lobbyists and people who could cooperate with Chile before the US Senate and also for the UN's forthcoming session that year." Espinoza testified on April 24 that Contreras ordered him to designate an agent for the mission with a companion fluent in English; he chose Fernández Larios, and "the name of the second man was suggested by then-Major Iturriaga, under the name Andrés Wilson," who "turned out to be the same person I had known since November or December 1974 as Michael Townley." Fernández Larios said he was told "once in the US I had to speak with a CIA chief named Vernon Walters, because he was going to give me a list of people sympathetic to Chile for purposes of presenting the Chilean position before the United Nations." The second pair, Captains René Riveros and Rolando Mosqueira, could not find him; General Nilo Floody of the Chilean military mission, who had known Walters since 1974, had his secretary telephone Walters's office and was told "that he was out of town, that he no longer belonged to the CIA, and that upon his return he would presumably rejoin the Army." The FBI interviewed Walters on June 14, 1978, at the Chilean prosecutor's request. "When told that several DINA officials were claiming that their trip to the US in August of 1976 was to see him, the General laughed and dismissed the idea as being ludicrous on its face, saying it was impossible since he had retired during the previous month." He said his trip to Paraguay "had been completely unrelated to the Letelier assassination," that "at no time had he discussed with any Paraguayan officials the issuance of false passports," that his only contact with Contreras had been the 1975 visit, and he "offered to take a polygraph examination." Propper added: "I have been advised by the CIA that General Vernon Walters retired from the CIA on July 2, 1976. He was no longer there at the time either mission to the United States by DINA personnel took place."²²

As ambassador at large for President Ronald Reagan, Walters visited Pinochet in February 1981. "We spoke as old friends," he reported. "He offered full support and said he would do anything we wanted to help us in the Salvadoran situation." He told a congressional committee that the Letelier bombing had been "a mistake," like Napoleon's execution of the Duke of Enghien: "You can't rub their noses in it forever."¹⁹

Later Career

After retiring from the CIA and from active military service in 1976, Walters published his memoir, "Silent Missions" (Doubleday, 1978), covering his career through Watergate.

Under President Ronald Reagan, Walters served as Ambassador-at-Large from 1981 to 1985, during which he visited 108 countries. He served as US Ambassador to the United Nations from May 22, 1985 to March 15, 1989, becoming the first American UN delegate to address the General Assembly in Russian. He served as US Ambassador to West Germany from April 24, 1989 to October 3, 1990, and remained as Ambassador to unified Germany from October 3, 1990 to August 18, 1991, spanning the period of German reunification.